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The bubble and burst pattern in asset market experiments is among the most replicable 
results in experimental economics.  Numerous studies have searched for means to reduce 
this mispricing.   Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in standard 
double auction markets to prices in two clock auctions.  The double Dutch auction, shown to 
be more efficient than the double auction in commodity market experiments, does not 
eliminate bubbles.  However, the English Dutch auction does yield prices reflective of 
underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in 
the common declining fundamental value environment. 
 
 
 
Key Words: Asset Markets, Experimental Economics, Institutional Design  
JEL Codes: C91, D02, D14, G12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
                                                          
1 Acknowledgements:  We wish to thank Mark DeSantis, David Porter, and Vernon Smith for helpful comments 
on this project. We are also very thankful to Miloš Fišar for his assistance with programming. We gratefully 
acknowledge financial support from Waikato Management School, University of Waikato. 
2 The University of Alabama and Chapman University 
3 MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory, Macquarie Graduate School of Management and University of 
Economics in Bratislava 
4 The University of Waikato 
1 
 
I. Introduction 
Ever since Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) introduced what has become the canonical 
environment for studying asset prices in the laboratory, researchers have puzzled over how 
to eliminate the price bubbles that often occur in such settings.  We ask if a market 
mechanism can be designed to eliminate bubbles in financial asset markets.  A wealth of 
evidence from empirical studies including laboratory and field experiments clearly 
demonstrates that institutions matter.  As defined by Smith (1982), institutions determine the 
set of actions available to economic agents, the incentives they face, and the information they 
have at the time of making their decisions. Thus, “institutions matter, because incentives and 
information matter” (Smith, 1994).  
Because market outcomes can differ between institutions, it is plausible that the persistent 
overpricing observed in asset market experiments may be dampened or even eliminated 
when certain trading rules are implemented.  This approach differs from attempts to reduce 
bubbles through eliminating confusion because those often rely heavily upon training traders 
with common experience and/or information that are specific to the characteristics of the 
underlying asset being traded, which is unlikely to be available in financial markets or outside 
of the laboratory in general.  By contrast, implementation of an institutional solution requires 
no prior knowledge of the asset’s characteristics.   
We study two alternative pricing rules, the double Dutch auction and the English Dutch 
auction and compare their performance with the continuous double auction, the standard-
bearer when studying asset market bubbles. The double Dutch auction utilizes two pricing 
clocks:  one clock with a falling price for the buyers and one with a rising price for sellers.  As 
the buyers’ clock falls, buyers’ revealed demand increases as in a typical multi-unit Dutch 
clock auction.  This demand revelation happens in conjunction with the sellers’ clock 
increasing to identify willing sellers and thus increase revealed supply.  The English Dutch 
auction relies on a single clock that acts simultaneously as an English clock for buyers and a 
Dutch clock for sellers, operating in a way that as the clock price increases, revealed quantity 
demanded decreases while revealed quantity supplied increases.  In the double Dutch 
auction, the buyers’ clock decreases and thus provides an incentive to over-reveal demand; 
but, in the English Dutch auction buyers face an increasing clock and thus have an incentive 
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to under-reveal demand.  The incentives to over- or under-reveal demand are a crucial 
distinguishing feature between the two institutions.  However, both the double Dutch and 
the English Dutch auctions generate a uniform market-clearing price, which prevents intra-
period speculation, similar to the call market experiments of Van Boening, Williams, and 
LaMaster (1993).   
We replicate the standard bubble and burst pattern using the double auction.  We find that 
the double Dutch markets lead to bubbles similar to those observed in the double auction 
experiments, just as the call markets of Van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993) did.  
However, the English Dutch auction, which focuses a trader’s attention on their own 
willingness to buy or sell at various prices, eliminates bubbles.  This results holds despite our 
use of inexperienced traders in a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing 
cash to asset ratio, all three of which are factors previously found to exacerbate overpricing. 
II. Background 
One of the most robust experimental results is the convergence to competitive equilibrium 
by the double auction market of Smith (1962).  In such markets, buyers and sellers have 
assigned roles and cannot speculate via purchasing an asset in the hope of reselling it at a 
profit.  In these markets, which Dickhaut, Lin, Porter, and Smith (2012) refer to as reflecting 
conditions for commodities like “hamburgers and haircuts,” traders quickly find the 
equilibrium and achieve high levels of efficiency.  Thus, the double auction was an obvious 
institution for Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) to rely on when creating an experiment 
in which to study the causes of bubbles in financial markets where people can speculate 
across periods.  To their surprise, overpricing appeared spontaneously, a result that has 
spawned a massive literature in economics and finance.   
A major theme in the experimental asset market literature has been the search for means to 
eliminate mispricing.  Short selling, buying on margin, pricing collars, futures markets have all 
been found to have only limited success in reducing mispricing (King, Smith, Williams, and 
Van Boening 1993; Haruvy and Noussair 2006; Porter and Smith 1995; Noussair, Tucker, and 
Xu 2016; see also Noussair and Tucker 2013 and Palan 2013 for surveys). Subject 
sophistication has also been questioned, but King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) 
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found that professional traders also generated speculative bubbles (see also Weitzel, Huer, 
Huber, Kirchler, Lindner, and Rose 2018).  
Recently, Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl (2012) has suggested that the declining fundamental 
value and increasing cash to asset ratio of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) led to subject 
confusion coupled with extreme liquidity and is responsible for driving observed bubbles.  
Framing the asset as shares of a depletable gold mine, Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl (2012) 
reports that mispricing is substantially reduced.  However, Cheung, Hedegaard, and Palan 
(2014) argues that public knowledge among subjects of common enhanced directions or 
framing techniques designed to reduce confusion may actually be harmonizing traders’ 
beliefs about the prices at which others will be willing to trade or their beliefs about the beliefs 
of others.   This convergence of beliefs may in turn reduce speculative motives.  Specifically, 
Cheung, Hedegaard, and Palan (2014) shows that markets in which all traders are given 
extensive training still generate bubbles unless the fact that all of the traders are undergoing 
such training is common knowledge.     
Overall, the most reliable method of eliminating bubbles in the lab is experience.   Smith, 
Suchanek, and Williams (1988) show that twice experienced traders generated prices close to 
fundamental value.  They attribute this to the creation of common expectations.  Hussam, 
Porter, and Smith (2008) shows that the experience must be common to the group as the 
introduction of new traders or a new environment can rekindle bubbles, although 
Duwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) find that an influx of inexperienced traders may not 
lead to large bubbles.5  This experience effect is consistent with both reduced confusion and 
a harmonization of beliefs.   
However, financial markets are ever changing and therefore common experience in the 
specific setting is not a viable policy prescription for reducing bubbles outside the laboratory 
and neither is common knowledge of extensive training regarding fundamental value.  Thus, 
it is important to look for alternative mechanisms, such as institutional rules, for reducing 
mispricing.  Because of its success in many other settings, most of the research on asset 
markets has relied upon the double auction, but Dickhaut, Lin, Porter, and Smith (2012) show 
                                                          
5 Deck, Porter, and Smith (2014) find that introducing new traders over the course of an asset’s life can cause 
bubbles to rekindle within a market.   
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that the mere ability to speculate reduces the efficiency of double auction markets.  
Therefore, we explore the ability of two alternative institutions to reduce asset mispricing.  
Other researchers have unsuccessfully pursued similar efforts.  For example, Van Boening, 
Williams, and LaMaster (1993) showed the familiar bubble and burst pattern in a declining 
fundamental value environment occurred when trading is organized by call markets. More 
recently, Bachestanian, Lugovskyy, Puzzello, and Tucker (2014) compare double auction and 
call markets to those organized by a Tatonnement process.  They report that bubbles 
persisted under the Tatonnement auction, although they were smaller than the bubbles 
observed under the other two institutions using standard measures.       
One alternative institution, which we investigate in the lab, is the double Dutch auction 
introduced by McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1992).  The double Dutch auction uses two Dutch 
clocks:  one clock with a falling price for the buyers and one with a rising price for sellers.  As 
the buyers clock falls and revealed demand increases, the sellers clock increases to identify 
sellers and thus increase revealed supply.   In haircut and hamburger markets, McCabe, 
Rassenti, and Smith (1992) demonstrate that the double Dutch auction actually outperforms 
the double auction leading to their titular question “Is Double Dutch the Best?” Its prior 
success makes this an obvious institution to consider, but ultimately we find that the double 
Dutch is not best for financial assets when traders can speculate as it generates significant 
mispricing.  This failure subsequently led us to test a third institution, the English Dutch 
auction.  We find that the set of trading rules effectively eliminates mispricing and thus it may 
be best for asset markets, leading to our titular question.6 The English Dutch auction relies on 
a single clock that simultaneously serves as an English clock to buyers and a Dutch clock to 
sellers.  As the clock price increases, quantity demanded is reduced while quantity supplied is 
increased.7   
The success of the English Dutch auction may be attributed to the institution providing 
incentives for buyers to under-reveal their demand.  Price paths frequently observed in asset 
                                                          
6 Of course, there may be other institutions that are even more effective at reducing mispricing in asset 
markets.  So the English Dutch auction may not be best in a global sense, but it is the best among the 
institutions that have been tested in the laboratory.   
7 In addition to the double Dutch auction, McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1992) introduce the Dutch English 
auction, as well as a double English auction, but do not mention the English Dutch auction although its 
structure is obvious given their work.    
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markets are characterized by an initial rise in prices that climb well above the fundamental 
value and eventually crash towards the end of the market.  Thus, institutional features that 
encourage under-revealing of demand may be critical in dampening bubbles.  In the English 
Dutch auction, the buyer clock is always rising, and thus the longer the clock runs, the worse 
prices are for buyers.  Therefore, buyers have an incentive to stop the clock, under-revealing 
their demand.  Conversely, the Double Dutch auction provides just the opposite incentives 
given that the clocks move in favour of the buyers, i.e. clocks continually decrease in price, 
and thus provide incentives to over-reveal demand.       
III. The Experiment 
The experiment consisted of 15 sessions.  Each session was comprised of either 8 or 9 subjects 
that were recruited from undergraduate courses at The University of Waikato via the ORSEE 
recruitment program (Greiner, 2015).8 Each subject participated in a single session and none 
had any experience with asset market experiments.  The experiment was computerized and 
employed the Z-tree software package (Fischbacher, 2007).  Transactions were denominated 
in an experimental currency called “francs” and converted to New Zealand dollars at the end 
of the experiment at a publicly known exchange rate.9  Each session lasted about 90 minutes 
and subjects earned approximately 40 NZD on average.  
Subject traders were initially endowed with 10 units of an asset and a cash balance of 10,000 
francs.  The assets had a finite life of 15 periods during which traders could exchange cash 
and assets with each other.  At the end of each period a dividend payment was randomly 
determined for the asset and this amount was added to the cash balance of the asset’s owner.  
Dividends were drawn from a four-point distribution of 0, 8, 28, and 60 francs, each with equal 
probability.  Thus, the expected value of the dividend payment in any period was 24 francs.  
The value of the dividend in a given period did not depend on the identity of the asset’s owner.  
Further, in each period the dividend was the same for every asset in the market.  After the 
final dividend payment at the end of period 15 the asset was worthless.  Therefore, the 
                                                          
8 All the sessions of Double Dutch and English Dutch treatments consisted of 9 subjects.  The baseline double 
auction treatment consisted of 8 subjects in each session as the double auction sessions were originally 
designed to be part of a different study.   
9 The exchange rate ranged from 360 to 550 francs to 1 NZD depending upon the treatment due to expected 
differences in timeframes to complete sessions.   
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fundamental value of the asset at any point in the experiment equalled the expected value of 
24 francs times the number of periods (or dividend payments) remaining in the market.  This 
structure was common information among the traders. 10   
The experiment consisted of three between–subjects treatments with the trading institution 
as the treatment variable: Double Auction (DA), Double Dutch (DD) and English Dutch (ED).  In 
all treatments, subjects were allowed to buy and sell units of the asset as long as they had 
sufficient cash inventory to cover the purchase or sufficient asset inventory to make the sale.  
No short selling or borrowing was allowed.  The inventories of cash and assets carried over 
from period to period such that for each subject, the cash balance and inventory of assets at 
the beginning of period t+1 were the same as those at the end of period t.11 
In the DA treatment, the computerized continuous double auction trading rules were 
employed (see Smith 1962 and Plott and Gray 1990 for a description).  Under the continuous 
double auction rules, each period of the market was opened for fixed period of 3 minutes.  At 
any time within a period, subjects could submit a bid or an offer to the market.  A bid (offer) 
specified a price at which a subject is willing to buy (sell) a unit of the asset.  All bids and offers 
were displayed to all subjects on their computer screens.  Any subject with sufficient funds 
(assets) could have accepted an outstanding offer to sell (bid to buy) at any time.  Upon the 
acceptance of a bid or an offer, a transaction would have been completed and the asset and 
cash would be transferred between the transacting parties.  Thus, in the parlance of stock 
market trading bids and offers represent limit orders whereas acceptances represent market 
orders.      
In the DD treatment, we replicated the double Dutch trading institution introduced by 
McCabe et al. (1992).  This institution uses two Dutch clocks, i.e., a descending price Buyers’ 
Clock and an ascending price Sellers’ Clock.  The clocks present tentative prices at which one 
could buy or sell, respectively.  At the beginning of a period, the Sellers’ clock always starts at 
0 francs.  The Buyers’ Clock starts at 900 francs in the first period as this is the maximum 
possible total dividend payment for an asset (900 francs = 15 periods × 60 francs / period).  In 
                                                          
10 This is the same dividend distribution used in numerous asset market studies, e.g., Smith et al. (1988), King 
et al. (1993), Porter and Smith (1995), Lei et al. (2001), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Noussair and Tucker 
(2006), and Hussam et al. (2008). 
11 Any dividends received at the end of period t were added to the cash balances to be carried over to period 
t+1.  Thus, the environment had an increasing cash to asset ratio providing a tough test of an institution.   
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every subsequent period, the Buyers’ Clock starts at twice the market clearing price of the 
previous period.12 Within a period, the clocks operate in an alternating fashion so that only 
one clock is active at any time.  Traders indicate a willingness to trade at the clock price on 
the currently operating clock by stopping it.  This action locks the trader into a transaction at 
a price that is at least as favourable as the clock price when the trader stopped the clock.   A 
uniform market clearing price is determined when the two clocks cross.  All transactions in 
the market occur at this crossing price.   
Each period starts with the activation of one of the clocks.  The clock that is activated first in 
a period alternates from period to period.  An activated clock always starts with a 3 second 
countdown to allow subjects to “stop” the clock and thus indicate a willingness to make 
multiple trades at a given price.  If no subject stops the active clock within the 3 second 
countdown, the clock ticks until either a trader stops it (thus indicating a willingness to trade 
at that price) or the two clocks have the same price (in which case the market clearing price 
is determined and the market closes).  As long as the two clock prices do not match, after a 
clock is stopped, one of the clocks is activated. More specifically, if there is excess demand in 
the market, then the Sellers’ Clock is activated to find a seller who can meet that demand.  If 
there is excess supply in the market, then the Buyers’ Clock is activated.13 If there is no excess 
supply or demand in the market after a trader stops an active clock, then the previously active 
clock starts once again.  This procedure ensures that there is not a consistent upwards or 
downwards pressure on the market prices.   In order to ensure multiple units of the asset may 
enter the market at a single same price, the clocks are always restarted at the price at which 
they were previously stopped.   
An example may be useful.  Suppose that in the first period the Buyer’ Clock starts at 900 and 
when the Buyers’ Clock falls to a price of 600 a trader stops it indicating that buyer is willing 
to buy a unit of the asset at 600.  Because there is now excess demand, the Sellers’ Clock 
                                                          
12 The starting prices may well be important parameters for these markets. To the degree that our choices may 
bias behavior one would expect to observe prices holding constant from period to period since the closing 
price in the previous period is the average of the starting prices in the next period.  Because of the leeway in 
parameter selection, the double Dutch and the English Dutch auctions are really classes of institutions.  The 
same is true of the double auction as the market designer has several options including the openness of the 
bid book or the requirement of an improvement rule. 
13 Since the subjects are limited to single unit contracts, the maximum excess supply/demand in the market at 
any time is a single unit. 
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becomes active and starts ticking up.  Suppose a trader stops this clock at 300, indicating the 
trader is willing to sell a unit of the asset at a price of 300.  At this point the number of assets 
being bought and sold are equal, so the Sellers’ Clock continues to be active.  During the 3 
second countdown a trader stops the clock indicating a willingness to sell a unit at 300.  Now 
there is excess supply so the Buyers’ Clock becomes active.  Suppose the price of the Buyers’ 
Clock falls from 600 down to 400 where a trader stops it.  The number of buyers and sellers is 
balanced so the Buyers’ Clock is activated.  Suppose it falls until it reaches 300, the price of 
the inactive Sellers’ Clock.  In this case, the market closes.  The market clearing price is 300 
and two units are exchanged among the traders who stopped the clocks. 
The active clock always ticks in 1 franc increments, but the speed at which the clocks ticks is 
determined by the disparity between the current prices on the two clocks.  If the difference 
in prices is greater than 200 francs, then the clock tick rate is 1 franc per 1/10th second.  If the 
prices differ by less than 200 francs but more than 30 francs, then the clock tick rate is 1 franc 
per 1/5th second.  If the two prices are less than 30 francs apart, then the tick rate is 1 franc 
per second.   
In the English Dutch treatment, the institution consists of a single clock that simultaneously 
acts as English clock for buyers and a Dutch clock for sellers.  The starting price in each period 
is zero.  Prior to the start of the clock, traders are asked to specify the number of assets they 
would like to buy at a price of zero.14 As a result, the excess demand at a price of 0 is 
determined.  The clock, which represents a tentative price is then activated and begins to 
increase.  At any point a trader can reduce the number of assets she wishes to purchase.    
Thus, the clock is an English auction for buyers who reduce their demand as prices increase.  
Once a trader has reduced her demand to zero, as the price continues to increase the trader 
can indicate a willingness to sell assets she owns at a price equal to or greater than the current 
clock price.  For sellers, the clock functions like a Dutch auction as prices become more 
                                                          
14 As explained in the instructions, each subject was endowed with 10 units of the asset, and thus the total 
number of assets available in the market was 10 times the number of traders.  The maximum number of assets 
a subject is allowed to buy at the initial price of zero is constrained to available outstanding number of assets 
in the market, i.e. total number of assets in the market minus number of assets currently in the subject’s 
inventory.  If a trader does not want to purchase any units in the following period, they can enter a zero 
quantity. 
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attractive.  As traders begin reducing their quantity demanded and increasing their quantity 
supplied, the excess demand in the market is reduced. Once the excess demand equals zero, 
the clock stops, the market is closed and all positions are cleared at the final clock price.  Thus, 
the English Dutch auction works by trying to eliminate excess demand.                
Pragmatically, traders who have excess demand have a series of buttons on their screen that 
allow them to decrease their demand by one unit, five units, or all demanded units.  The 
software also forces a trader to reduce demand based on the trader’s budget constraint (i.e. 
the trader must hold enough cash to purchase the number of units she is demanding at the 
current price).  Once a trader’s demand reaches zero, the buttons on the screen are replaced 
by buttons allowing them to increase their supply by one unit, five units, or all (owned) units.  
The multiple unit changes mean that there may be instances where the market overshoots 
causing excess supply, in which case the market closes at that price and the surplus units are 
not traded (the additional units sold only apply to the last trader). The increment of the 
English Dutch clock is similar to that for the double Dutch in that the speed slows as the 
market closing nears.   
The timing of events in each session proceeded as follows: (1) Subjects entered the computer 
lab and chose a computer terminal to use for the session. (2) Instructions for the asset market 
were distributed and subjects were allowed 15 minutes to read the instructions on their own 
(see appendix). (3) The experimenter provided a summary of the main features of the market 
and interface by reviewing a market screenshot that was projected at the front of the lab. (4) 
Subjects completed a short quiz on the dividend process (see appendix) with the 
experimenter reviewing the quiz answers and addressing any questions privately with each 
subject. (5) The trading market was conducted. (6) Upon completion of the market, subjects 
were privately paid their cash earnings for the session and dismissed from the experiment. 15 
                                                          
15 As part of a separate project, participants in this study and other studies being conducted at the same lab 
were incentivised to answer the three standard cognitive reflection task (CRT) questions of Frederick (2005) 
after the experiment.  We do not analyse the data here in part because we believe that this procedure and the 
correct answers became known among the subject pool participants over time.  As mentioned previously, the 
English Dutch auction was implemented after the initial Double Dutch and Double Auction were 
completed.  The average CRT score increased from 1.38 out of 3 for the first two treatments to 2.24 out of 3 
for the last one. The former number is in line with those reported in other studies conducted at similar 
institutions and consistent historically with data collected in the same lab, whereas the latter greatly exceeds 
the extreme scores reported elsewhere such as the student sample from MIT which scored 2.18 out of 3 as 
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IV. Results 
The time series of average period prices by treatment and fundamental value are plotted in 
Figure 1.   In the DA treatment, the average transaction prices exhibit a traditional price 
bubble pattern of initial prices relatively close to fundamental value, followed by a decoupling 
of prices from fundamental value as the bubble forms, and eventuating in prices crashing 
down to fundamental value in the last two periods.  This figure is comparable to figures shown 
in many of the previously cited papers.   
 
Figure 1: Time Series of Market Prices  
Average Price by Treatment 
 
Double Auction 
 
Double Dutch 
 
English Dutch 
 
                                                          
reported by Frederick (2005).  However, even if the CRT scores are accurate we do not believe this drives the 
treatment effects we report in the next section.  The justification for this belief is that the correlation between 
CRT and either measure of bubble size that we report is small and insignificant within each treatment.  That is, 
we have no evidence that higher average CRT scores lead to better performance within a treatment, 
something that should be true if performance is driven CRT.  Further, for the one English Dutch session that 
had a more typical average CRT score (1.55 out of 3), its bubble measures are lower than the bubble measures 
for the (5 of 10) sessions in other treatments which had average the same or higher CRT scores.  Again, this 
suggests market performance is not driven by the cognitive reflection of the subjects.       
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The DD treatment initially leads to higher prices than the DA treatment, with average prices 
above those of the DA for the first 6 periods.  However, in the middle and latter portion of 
the trading horizon the DD has lower average prices.  Casual inspection of Figure 1 suggests 
that while the DA leads to an inflating and then bursting bubble, the DD has a steady level of 
overpricing followed by a sudden collapse at the end of the trading horizon.   By contrast, the 
ED treatment yields price that closely tracks fundamental value over the entire trading 
horizon.  
To more precisely analyze differences in bubble formation between treatments, we calculate 
and compare the two common standardized bubble measures used in the literature (see 
Stöckl et al. 2010).  Relative Deviation (RD) is defined as 1
𝑇𝑇
∑ (𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡)/|𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����|𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1  where T 
denotes the total number of periods in the market, 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 is the average transaction price in 
period t, FVt is the fundamental value in period t, and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹���� is the average fundamental value 
over the trading horizon.16 Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) is defined as 1
𝑇𝑇
∑ |(𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 −𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡)|/|𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹����|.  RD indicates the direction of departure from fundamental value, i.e. whether 
prices are above or below fundamental value on average.  RAD is similar to RD except that 
the numerator takes the absolute value of the differences between prices and fundamental 
value.  Thus, RD is a measure of overpricing while RAD is a measure of mispricing.  The 
denominators for both calculations provide a normalization to facilitate comparisons with 
other asset market environments (i.e. different dividend structures and trading horizons).   
 
The top portion of Table 1 shows the average value of the two bubble measures for each 
treatment.  To determine whether these differences are significantly different, we conduct 
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests with an individual session as the unit of observation.  The 
bottom part of Table 1 reports the z-scores and corresponding p-values in brackets for each 
pairwise test.  The table confirms that, on average, ED has relatively small deviations from 
fundamental value and both lower overpricing and less mispricing than either DA and DD.  
From the table, nominally DA has the greatest mispricing and overpricing, but there is no 
statistically significant difference in bubble measures between DA and DD in our sample. 
                                                          
16 DD and ED are uniform price auctions and thus the market-clearing price is necessarily the average 
transaction price.   
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Table 1: Comparison of Bubble Measures across Treatments 
 
Average Bubble Measures RD RAD 
DA 0.858 0.925 
DD 0.526 0.595 
ED 0.056 0.198 
 
Treatment Comparison 
DA v DD -0.94 
[0.347] 
-1.358 
[0.175] 
DA v ED -2.611*** 
[0.009] 
-2.611*** 
[0.009] 
DD v ED -1.776* 
[0.076] 
-1.776* 
[0.076] 
Treatment comparisons are z-scores of Mann-Whitney Rank Sum tests [p-values are 
given in brackets]. * and *** denote the 10% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
The similarity in RAD and RD test statistics for comparing ED to the other institutions 
is due to the substantial upward bias in prices in the other institutions.      
 
 
V. Discussion 
 
Starting with Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), the spontaneous presence of bubbles in 
asset markets with common information regarding fundamental value has been a puzzling 
and enduring behavioral pattern.  Several studies have investigated various means of 
reducing or eliminating this mispricing, such as the margin trading, short selling, price 
collars, and the use of highly sophisticated traders, but to date the creation of common 
expectations either through repetition or training procedures has been the only reliable 
means to do so.  However, these successful techniques are unlikely to be practical outside of 
the laboratory.        
In this paper, we demonstrate that an alternative trading institution, the double Dutch 
auction, that has previously been shown to outperform the standard double auction in 
commodity markets does not reduce mispricing in asset markets.  However, we do find 
evidence that a previously unexplored institution, the English Dutch auction, does lead to 
prices that closely track fundamental value in asset markets.  This pattern holds despite our 
use of a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing cash to asset ratio, 
two factors that have been shown to contribute to bubble formation in previous studies.  It 
also holds despite the absence of other features of naturally occurring markets generally 
believed to dampen bubbles such as short selling. That this institutional success even holds 
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with naïve traders who lack experience or the benefit of replication is particularly impressive 
as that has been the most robust mechanism for eliminating mispricing in previous 
laboratory experiments. In sum, we believe our experimental results suggest an important 
avenue for future work research in asset pricing and offer a promising market design 
alternative for taming bubbles.  
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APPENDIX 
 
General Instructions (Double Auction) 
 
This experiment will consist of fifteen trading periods in which you will have the opportunity 
to buy and sell in a market.  The currency used in the market is francs.  All trading and earnings 
will be in terms of francs.   
 
________ francs = 1 NZ dollar 
 
Your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars when you 
leave the lab today.  The more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn.   
 
In each period, you may buy and sell units of a good called X in a market.  X can be considered 
an asset with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of X carries over from one trading period 
to the next.  Each unit of X in your inventory at the end of each trading period pays a dividend 
to you. The dividend paid on each unit is the same for every participant. 
 
You will not know the exact value of the dividend per unit until the end of each trading period. 
The dividend is determined by chance at the end of each period by a random number 
generator.  The dividend in each period has an equally likely chance of being 0, 8, 28, or 60. 
The information is provided in the table below.   
 
Dividend → 0 8 28 60 
Likelihood → 25% 25% 25% 25% 
 
The average dividend per period for each unit of X is 24 francs. 
The dividend draws in each period are independent. That means that the likelihood of a 
particular dividend in a period is not affected by the dividend in previous periods.  
2. Your Earnings 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given […] francs in your Cash inventory.  Your 
earnings for the entire experiment are equal to your Cash inventory at the end of period 15.  
All dividends you receive are added to your Cash inventory.  
All money spent on purchases is subtracted from your Cash inventory. 
All money received from sales is added to your Cash inventory. 
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Example of earnings from dividends: if you have 6 units of X at the end of period 3 and the 
dividend draw is 8 francs (which has a 25% chance of occurring), then your dividend 
earnings for period 3 are equal to 6 units x 8 francs = 48 francs. 
3.  Average Value Holding Table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE (attached at the end of this document) 
to help you make decisions.  It calculates the average amount of dividends you will receive if 
you keep a unit of X until the end of the experiment.  It also describes how to calculate how 
much in future dividends you give up on average when you sell a share at any time.  The 
following describes each of the columns in the table. 
1. Ending Period: period 15 is the last trading period within the experiment, and thus the last 
period for which to receive a dividend payment.  After the final dividend payment in period 
15, each unit of X is worthless. 
2. Current Period: the period during which the average holding value is being calculated.  For 
example, in period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to “Current Period 1” are in 
effect. 
3. Number of Remaining Dividend Payments: the number of times that a dividend can be 
received from the current period until the final period (period 15).  That is, it indicates the 
number of random asset payment draws remaining in the lifetime of the asset.  It is calculated 
by taking the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current period number, and adding 
1, because the dividend is also paid in the current period. 
4. Average Dividend Value per Period: the average amount of each dividend.  As we indicated 
earlier, the average dividend in each period is 24 francs per unit of X. 
5. Average Holding Value per Unit of Inventory: the average value of holding a unit of X for 
the remainder of the experiment.  That is, for each unit of X you hold in your inventory for 
the remainder of the experiment, you receive on average the amount listed in column 5.  The 
number in Average Holding Value is calculated by multiplying the Number of Remaining 
Dividend Payments with the Average Dividend Payment per Period. 
Please have a look at the table now and make sure you understand it.  The following example 
may help in your understanding. 
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining.  Since the dividend paid on a unit of 
X has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28, and a 25% 
chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for each unit of X.  
If you hold a unit of X for 7 periods, the total dividend paid on the unit over the 7 periods is 
on average 7*24 = 168. 
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4.  Market and Trading Rules 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will have an initial inventory of […] units of X and […] 
francs.  The experiment will consist of 15 periods.  In each period, each participant will have 
an opportunity to buy and sell units of X.  The following is an example of your bidding screen.  
 
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is remaining in the current 
Period. In the top left hand corner of your screen you see the current Period and how many 
periods remaining.  Your Cash on Hand and your inventory of X are in the left column. 
If you would like to offer to sell a unit of X, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell” in 
the second column. In that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell 
a unit of X, and then select “SUBMIT OFFER TO SELL”. 
As people submit offers to sell units of X, these offers will appear in the third column from 
the left, entitled “Offers To Sell”. The lowest ask price will always be on the bottom of that 
list and will, by default, be selected. You can select a different offer by clicking on it. If you 
select the “BUY” button, you will buy one unit of X for the currently selected sell price. 
When you buy a unit of X, your Cash on Hand decreases by the price of the purchase. When 
you sell a unit of X, your Cash on Hand increases by the price of the sale. You may make an 
offer to buy a unit by typing a price at which you are willing to purchase one unit of X in the 
text area “Enter offer to buy,” and then pressing the red button labelled “SUBMIT OFFER TO 
BUY”. You can sell to the person who submitted the highest offer to buy if you click on “SELL”.  
In the middle column, labelled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at which units of 
X have been bought and sold in this period. 
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5. Recording your earnings   
 
At the end of each period, a summary screen will be provided to you (an example of the 
summary screen is illustrated below).   
 
On your PERIOD EARNINGS SHEET please record the following information from the summary 
screen.  At the beginning of period 1, record your cash on hand at the beginning of the period 
in column 2 in the row marked period 1.  In column 3, record your earnings from sales minus 
expenditures on purchases for the period.  Record your inventory of units at the end of the 
period in column 4 in the row marked period 1.  Fill in the dividend of each unit in column 5.  
Record your dividend earnings for the period in column 6. In column 7, record your cash on 
hand at the end of the period. Record your cash on hand at the beginning of the period in 
column 8. Your earnings in each period equal the difference in your cash on hand at the end 
of the period minus the cash on hand at the beginning of the period. Record your period 
earnings in column 9. Repeat this procedure to obtain the period earnings of all periods.  
END OF PERIOD CASH= BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH + DIVIDEND PER UNIT * NUMBER OF 
UNITS IN INVENTORY AT THE END OF PERIOD+SALES -PURCHASES 
PERIOD EARNINGS = END OF PERIOD CASH – BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH 
Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.  Your earnings for this experiment are given 
by the cash on hand at the end of period 15.   
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Example of period earnings. Suppose that in period 10 your BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH is 
3,000 francs and your INVENTORY at the beginning of period 10 is 7 units of X.  If in period 10 
you sell 2 units of X at a price of 200 francs and the dividend draw is 8 francs, then in period 
10: 
END OF PERIOD CASH = 3,000 + 2*200 = 3,400 
INVENTORY (at the end of period 10) = 7 - 2 = 5 
PERIOD DIVIDEND EARNINGS = DIVIDEND PER UNIT * NUMBER OF UNITS IN INVENTORY = 8 
* 5 = 40. 
PERIOD EARNINGS = END OF PERIOD CASH – BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH + DIVIDEND PER 
UNIT * NUMBER OF UNITS IN INVENTORY AT THE END OF PERIOD = 3,400 – 3,000 + 8 * 5 = 
440. 
6. Quiz17 
Question 1: Suppose that you purchase a unit of X in period 5.   
a. What is the average dividend payment on the unit of X for period 5?  _____ 
b. If you hold that unit of X till the end of the experiment (11 periods including the current 
period), what is the average total dividend paid on the unit of X?  _____ 
c. What is the maximum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the experiment 
(11 periods including the current period)?  _____ 
d. What is the minimum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the experiment 
(11 periods including the current period)?  _____ 
Question 2: Suppose that you purchase a unit of X in period 15.   
a. What is the average dividend payment on the unit of X for period 15?  _____ 
b. If you hold that unit of X till the end of the experiment (1 period including the current 
period), what is the average total dividend paid on the unit of X?  _____ 
c. What is the maximum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the experiment 
(1 period including the current period)?  _____ 
d. What is the minimum possible dividend paid on the unit of X till the end of the experiment 
(1 period including the current period)?  _____ 
Question 3: What is the value of the asset after the final dividend payment in period 15? ______ 
                                                          
17 This quiz was conducted in each session.  In some sessions, the quiz was hand-run within the instruction 
packet and others the quiz was computerized via zTree. 
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PERIOD EARNINGS SHEET 
 
(1) 
PERIOD 
 
(2) 
BEGINNING 
CASH 
 
(3) 
+SALES 
-PURCHASES 
 
(4) 
INVENTORY AT THE 
END OF PERIOD 
 
(5) 
DIVIDEND 
PER UNIT 
 
(6) 
PERIOD DIVIDEND 
EARNINGS 
 
(7) 
END CASH 
 
(8) 
BEGINNING 
CASH 
 
(9) 
PERIOD 
EARNINGS 
1 […]      […]  
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
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AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE 
 
Ending 
Period 
Current Period 
(Before it Ends and 
a Dividend is Paid) 
Number of 
Remaining 
Dividend Payments 
* 
Average 
Dividend Value 
Per Period 
= 
Average Holding 
Value Per Unit of 
Inventory 
15 1 15 * 24 = 360 
15 2 14 * 24 = 333 
15 3 13 * 24 = 312 
15 4 12 * 24 = 288 
15 5 11 * 24 = 264 
15 6 10 * 24 = 240 
15 7 9 * 24 = 216 
15 8 8 * 24 = 192 
15 9 7 * 24 = 168 
15 10 6 * 24 = 144 
15 11 5 * 24 = 120 
15 12 4 * 24 = 96 
15 13 3 * 24 = 72 
15 14 2 * 24 = 48 
15 15 1 * 24 = 24 
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General Instructions (Double Dutch) 
 
This experiment will consist of fifteen trading periods in which you will have the opportunity 
to buy and sell in a market.  The currency used in the market is francs.  All trading and earnings 
will be in terms of francs.   
 
________ francs = 1 NZ dollar 
 
Your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars when you 
leave the lab today.  The more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn.   
 
In each period, you may buy and sell units of a good called X in a market.  X can be considered 
an asset with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of X carries over from one trading period 
to the next.  Each unit of X in your inventory at the end of each trading period pays a dividend 
to you. The dividend paid on each unit is the same for every participant. 
 
You will not know the exact value of the dividend per unit until the end of each trading period. 
The dividend is determined by chance at the end of each period by a random number 
generator.  The dividend in each period has an equally likely chance of being 0, 8, 28, or 60. 
The information is provided in the table below.   
 
Dividend → 0 8 28 60 
Likelihood → 25% 25% 25% 25% 
 
The average dividend per period for each unit of X is 24 francs. 
The dividend draws in each period are independent. That means that the likelihood of a 
particular dividend in a period is not affected by the dividend in previous periods.  
2. Your Earnings 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given […] francs in your Cash inventory.  Your 
earnings for the entire experiment are equal to your Cash inventory at the end of period 15.  
All dividends you receive are added to your Cash inventory.  
All money spent on purchases is subtracted from your Cash inventory. 
All money received from sales is added to your Cash inventory. 
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Example of earnings from dividends: if you have 6 units of X at the end of period 3 and the 
dividend draw is 8 francs (which has a 25% chance of occurring), then your dividend 
earnings for period 3 are equal to 6 units x 8 francs = 48 francs. 
3.  Average Value Holding Table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE18 to help you make decisions.  It 
calculates the average amount of dividends you will receive if you keep a unit of X until the 
end of the experiment.  It also describes how to calculate how much in future dividends you 
give up on average when you sell a share at any time.  The following describes each of the 
columns in the table. 
1. Ending Period: period 15 is the last trading period within the experiment, and thus the last 
period for which to receive a dividend payment.  After the final dividend payment in period 
15, each unit of X is worthless. 
2. Current Period: the period during which the average holding value is being calculated.  For 
example, in period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to “Current Period 1” are in 
effect. 
3. Number of Remaining Dividend Payments: the number of times that a dividend can be 
received from the current period until the final period (period 15).  That is, it indicates the 
number of random asset payment draws remaining in the lifetime of the asset.  It is calculated 
by taking the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current period number, and adding 
1, because the dividend is also paid in the current period. 
4. Average Dividend Value per Period: the average amount of each dividend.  As we indicated 
earlier, the average dividend in each period is 24 francs per unit of X. 
5. Average Holding Value per Unit of Inventory: the average value of holding a unit of X for 
the remainder of the experiment.  That is, for each unit of X you hold in your inventory for 
the remainder of the experiment, you receive on average the amount listed in column 5.  The 
number in Average Holding Value is calculated by multiplying the Number of Remaining 
Dividend Payments with the Average Dividend Payment per Period. 
Please have a look at the table now and make sure you understand it.  The following example 
may help in your understanding. 
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining.  Since the dividend paid on a unit of 
X has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28, and a 25% 
chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for each unit of X.  
                                                          
18 Average Holding Value Tables are identical across treatments and thus refer to Double Action instructions. 
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If you hold a unit of X for 7 periods, the total dividend paid on the unit over the 7 periods is 
on average 7*24 = 168. 
 
4.  Market and Trading Rules 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will have an initial inventory of […] units of X and […] 
francs.  The experiment will consist of 15 periods.  In each period, each participant will have 
an opportunity to buy and sell units of X.  The following is an example of your bidding screen. 
 
In the top left hand corner of your screen you see the current Period and how many periods 
remaining.  Your Cash on Hand and your inventory of X are in the left column. 
On the left hand side of the screen, there is a box labelled “Buy Price”.  The number in the 
box represents the price to buy one unit of X.  Similarly on the right hand side of the screen, 
there is a box labelled “Sell Price”.  The number in the box represents the price to sell one 
unit of X.  As you can see from the above example screen, the Buy Price is starts higher than 
the Sell Price.  These price boxes will highlight alternately during the period.  A highlighted 
box indicates the side of the market that is active.  For example, you may only sell a unit of X 
when the Sell Price box is highlighted and vice versa for buying a unit of X. 
 
When the period begins, one of the boxes will be highlighted indicating which side of the 
market is active and thus the type of transaction that is currently available and at what price.  
For example, suppose the Sell Price box is highlighted.  If you are willing to sell a unit of X at 
the highlighted price, then click the SELL button.  A three second countdown is given at the 
start of the period.  The price will not change for these three seconds allowing you to easily 
click the SELL button if you want to sell at that price.  After three seconds, the Sell Price will 
begin to rise rapidly.  If the price reaches a point that you are willing to sell a unit of X, the 
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click the SELL button.  As soon as someone clicks their SELL button, then the sell side becomes 
inactive and the buy side becomes highlighted and active.  The three second timer will begin.  
If no one clicks their BUY button during the first 3 seconds, then the price will begin to drop 
rapidly.  If the price reaches a point that you are willing to buy a unit of X, then click the BUY 
button. This switching between sides of markets continues until the period ends. 
The period will end when the Buy Price and the Sell Price are equal.  If you had indicated that 
you are willing to buy or sell a unit of X by clicking the BUY or SELL button respectively during 
the period, then your transactions will be completed at the market ending price where the 
Buy Price equals the Sell Price.   
 
 Note, when you click on the BUY (SELL) button for a given price during the period, you 
are indicating that you are willing to buy (sell) a unit of X at a price that is at least this 
favourable for you.  That is, the price that you eventually pay (receive) may be lower 
(higher) than when you clicked the BUY (sell) button.   
 
In the middle column, labelled “Transactions”, you can see the number of units of X that have 
been bought and sold in this period. 
The switching between the BUY side and SELL sides of the market depends upon how many 
units have been bought and sold.  If the number of units bought equals the number of units 
sold, then the same side of the market starts again.  If there are more units bought than units 
sold, then the SELL side starts.  If there are more units sold than bought, then the BUY side 
starts. 
If the Buy Price and the Sell Price are equal (and thus the period ends) and the number of 
units bought does not equal the number of units sold, then the last unit offered to buy/sell is 
not transacted. 
5. Recording your earnings   
 
At the end of each period, a summary screen will be provided to you (an example of the 
summary screen is illustrated below).   
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On your PERIOD EARNINGS SHEET19 please record the following information from the 
summary screen.  At the beginning of period 1, record your cash on hand at the beginning of 
the period in column 2 in the row marked period 1.  In column 3, record your earnings from 
sales minus expenditures on purchases for the period.  Record your inventory of units at the 
end of the period in column 4 in the row marked period 1.  Fill in the dividend of each unit in 
column 5.  Record your dividend earnings for the period in column 6. In column 7, record your 
cash on hand at the end of the period. Record your cash on hand at the beginning of the 
period in column 8. Your earnings in each period equal the difference in your cash on hand at 
the end of the period minus the cash on hand at the beginning of the period. Record your 
period earnings in column 9. Repeat this procedure to obtain the period earnings of all 
periods.  
END OF PERIOD CASH= BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH + DIVIDEND PER UNIT * NUMBER OF 
UNITS IN INVENTORY AT THE END OF PERIOD+SALES -PURCHASES 
PERIOD EARNINGS = END OF PERIOD CASH – BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH 
Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.  Your earnings for this experiment are given 
by the cash on hand at the end of period 15.   
Example of period earnings. Suppose that in period 10 your BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH is 
3,000 francs and your INVENTORY at the beginning of period 10 is 7 units of X.  If in period 10 
                                                          
19 Period Earnings Sheets are identical across treatments and thus refer to Double Action instructions. 
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you sell 2 units of X at a price of 200 francs and the dividend draw is 8 francs, then in period 
10: 
END OF PERIOD CASH = 3,000 + 2*200 = 3,400 
INVENTORY (at the end of period 10) = 7 - 2 = 5 
PERIOD DIVIDEND EARNINGS = DIVIDEND PER UNIT * NUMBER OF UNITS IN INVENTORY = 8 
* 5 = 40. 
PERIOD EARNINGS = END OF PERIOD CASH – BEGINNING OF PERIOD CASH + DIVIDEND PER 
UNIT * NUMBER OF UNITS IN INVENTORY AT THE END OF PERIOD = 3,400 – 3,000 + 8 * 5 = 
440. 
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General Instructions (English Dutch) 
 
This experiment will consist of fifteen trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy 
and sell in a market.  The currency used in the market is francs.  All trading and earnings will be in 
terms of francs.   
 
360 francs = 1 NZ dollar 
 
Your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars when you leave the 
lab today.  The more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn.   
 
In each period, you may buy or sell units of X in a market.  X can be considered an asset with a life of 
15 periods, and your inventory of X carries over from one trading period to the next.  Each unit of X in 
your inventory at the end of any trading period pays a dividend to you. The dividend paid on each 
asset is the same for every participant that period. 
 
No one will know the exact value of the dividend per unit until the end of each trading period. The 
dividend is determined by chance at the end of each period by a random number generator.  The 
dividend in each period has an equally likely chance of being 0, 8, 28, or 60. The information is provided 
in the table below.   
 
Dividend → 0 8 28 60 
Likelihood → 25% 25% 25% 25% 
 
The average dividend per period for each unit of X is 24 francs. 
The likelihood of a particular dividend in a period is not affected by the dividend in previous periods.  
2. Your Earnings 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given 10,000 francs in your Cash inventory.  Your 
earnings for the entire experiment are equal to your Cash inventory at the end of period 15.  
All dividends you receive at the end of each period are added to your Cash inventory.  
All money spent on purchases is subtracted from your Cash inventory. 
All money received from sales is added to your Cash inventory. 
 
Example of earnings from dividends: if you have 6 units of X at the end of period 3 and the dividend 
draw is 8 francs (which has a 25% chance of occurring), then your dividend earnings for period 3 are 
equal to 6 units x 8 francs = 48 francs. 
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3.  Average Value Holding Table 
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE20 to help you make decisions.  It calculates the 
average amount of dividends you will receive if you keep a unit of X until the end of the experiment.  
It also describes how to calculate how much in future dividends you give up on average when you sell 
a unit of X at any time.  The following describes each of the columns in the table. 
1. Ending Period: period 15 is the last trading period within the experiment, and thus the last period 
for which to receive a dividend payment.  After the final dividend payment in period 15, each unit of 
X is worthless. 
2. Current Period: the period during which the average holding value is being calculated.  For example, 
in period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to “Current Period 1” are in effect. 
3. Number of Remaining Dividend Payments: the number of times that a dividend can be received 
from the current period until the final period (period 15).  That is, it indicates the number of random 
dividend payment draws outstanding in the remaining lifetime of the asset.  It is calculated by taking 
the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current period number, and adding 1, because a 
dividend is paid at the end of the current period. 
4. Average Dividend Value per Period: the average amount of each dividend.  As we indicated earlier, 
the average dividend in each period is 24 francs. 
5. Average Holding Value per Unit of Inventory: the average value of holding a unit of X for the 
remainder of the experiment.  That is, for each unit of X you hold in your inventory for the remainder 
of the experiment, you receive on average the amount listed in column 5.  The number in Average 
Holding Value is calculated by multiplying the Number of Remaining Dividend Payments with the 
Average Dividend Payment per Period. 
Please have a look at the table now and make sure you understand it.  The following example may 
help in your understanding. 
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining including the current period.  Since the 
dividend paid on a unit of X has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of 
being 28, and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for 
each unit of X.  If you hold a unit of X for 7 periods, the total dividend paid on the unit over the 7 
periods is on average 7*24 = 168. 
 
                                                          
20 Average Holding Value Tables are identical across treatments and thus refer to Double Action instructions. 
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4.  Market and Trading Rules 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will have an initial inventory of 10 units of X and 10,000 francs.  
The experiment will consist of 15 periods.  In each period, each participant will have an opportunity 
to buy or sell units of X.  The following is an example of your Initial Purchase Offer screen.   
 
In the top left hand corner of your screen you see the current Period and how many periods are 
remaining.  Your Cash on Hand and your inventory of X are in the left column.  A summary of the 
information presented on your Average Holding Value Table is presented at the top center.  In the 
middle of the screen, the "Market Price" is listed, which represents the price to buy/sell a single unit.  
At the beginning of each period, the initially listed price is zero.  On this Initial Purchase Offer screen, 
you must enter the amount of X you want to purchase at a zero price by entering a number between 
0 and 90 in the box labeled "Buy Amount" and click the "To Buy" button.  Once everyone has submitted 
their initial purchase quantity, the program will continue to your Bidding Screen.  An example of this 
screen is listed below. 
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Once again, the period and Average Value Holding Table summary information are presented for you 
at the top of the screen and your Cash on Hand and inventory of X are in the left column.  In the middle 
of the screen is the "Market Price" which once again is initially listed as zero, the "Buy Amount" which 
is the number of units you stated you want to purchase at a zero Price, and the "Sell Amount" which 
is the number of units you want to sell at the listed Price (this is always zero at the beginning of a 
period).  The right column presents the "Total to Buy" which is the sum of all traders offers to buy at 
the listed Price and the "Total to Sell" which is the sum of all traders offers to sell at the listed Price 
(because everyone starts with 0 units of X as their Sell Amount, this total is also always zero at the 
beginning of a period).     
 
The program will have a 3 second countdown prior to the start of the period.  Once the countdown is 
completed, the price will begin to increase.  As the price increases, you will have the option to decrease 
the number of units you want to purchase by clicking one of the buttons on the bottom of the screen.  
Each time you click one of the buttons, the number of units you want to buy decreases by the amount 
listed on that button.  If your Buy Amount reaches zero, a new set of buttons appear allowing you to 
increase the amount you want to sell. 
 
The period ends when the sum of all traders' Buy Amount (presented on your screen as the Total to 
Buy) equals the sum of all traders' Sell Amount (similarly presented as the Total to Sell).  The price 
listed when Total to Buy equals Total to Sell is the price for all units of X bought and sold in the period.  
That is, if you have any units of X listed in your Buy Amount, this is the price you must pay for each 
unit.  Conversely, this is the price you will receive for each unit of X you have listed in your Sell Amount. 
 
Note, the quantities of X listed in your Buy Amount or Sell Amount are commitments to buy or sell 
respectively.  Because all units of X trade at the same price and the fact that the price continually 
increases throughout the period, the quantity you were willing to buy at a zero price listed in your 
Initial Purchase Offer becomes more expensive as the period progresses.  You will be committed to 
purchasing these units unless you reduce the amount you want to buy by clicking one of the buttons 
at the bottom of the page.  Conversely, if you click the buttons sufficiently to induce a positive amount 
to sell, i.e. your Sell Amount is greater than zero, then each unit to sell is a commitment and cannot 
be reduced. 
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There are two restrictions in the market.   
1. You cannot buy more units of X than you can afford.  That is, the listed Price multiplied by your 
Buy Amount cannot be more than the cash you have available.  Because every unit of X trades 
at the same price, as the listed Price increases throughout the period, the amount of cash you 
need to be able to complete the purchase(s) you agreed to (as listed by your Buy Amount) 
also increases.  This means that as the period progresses and the price continues to increase, 
you may not have enough money to purchase all the units listed in your Buy Amount.  If this 
occurs, the computer will automatically reduce the units of X in your Buy Amount to ensure 
you can afford all listed purchases.  To assist you in making your purchase/sell decisions, the 
computer will adjust your Cash on Hand based upon the number of units you have committed 
to purchase or sell and the listed Price. 
2. You cannot sell more units of X than you have in your inventory.  Therefore, if you commit to 
sell every unit of X you have, the sell buttons will become disabled. 
 
Because of the way this market works, you cannot buy and sell units of X in a single period.  Instead 
you will either be a net buyer of X, a net seller of X, or you will not trade any units of X.  You could buy 
shares of X in one period and sell them in a different period or vice versa. 
 
5. Recording your earnings   
 
At the end of each period, a summary screen will be provided to you. Below is an example of how your 
earnings are calculated each period.  
RESULTS AFTER PERIOD 5 (10 Periods Remain) 
 
Beginning X on Hand                                     4  
Units of X Purchased          +1 
Units of X Sold                       -0 
Closing X on Hand…………………………………..5         5    
Dividend per unit of X Held      x8 
Received Dividend Earnings……………………………… 40             40 
Beginning Cash on Hand                                                            +1450 
Cash Received from Sales        +0 
Cash Spent on Purchases    -350 
Change in Cash from Sales and Purchases………..-350        -350 
Closing Cash on Hand……………………………………………………….1140           1140 
 
Average Dividend Payment per Period       24 
Number of Periods Remaining      x10 
Average Holding Value per Unit………………………… 240       240 
Closing X on Hand (from line 4 above)              x5    
Average Holding Value of X on Hand………………………………..1200  +1200 
 
Average Profit with No Further Trading       2340   
 
In this example, period 5 has just been completed.  This person had a Beginning X on Hand of 4 units, 
purchased 1 unit by spending 350 to having a Closing X on Hand of 5 units of X.  The randomly selected 
dividend was 8 resulting in 5x8=40 in Received Dividend Earnings.   Since the person started with 1450 
Beginning Cash on Hand, had a Change in Cash from Sales and Purchase of -350 (=0 Cash Received 
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from Sales – 350 Cash Spent on Purchases) and had 40 Received Dividend Earnings, this person has a 
Closing Cash on Hand of 1140.  Since the Number of Remaining Periods in which dividends will be paid 
is 10, the Average Holding Value per Unit is 240.  As this person has a Closing X on Hand of 5, the 
Average Holding Value of X on Hand is 5x240=1200.  Therefore, if this person made no further trades, 
on average she would earn 1140 + 1200=2340 in the experiment.      
On your PERIOD EARNINGS SHEET21 please record the following information from the summary 
screen after each period.  For the completed period, record your Beginning Cash on Hand in column 
2.  In column 3, record your Change in Cash from Sales and Purchases (this is your earnings from sales 
minus expenditures on purchases for the period).  Record your inventory of units at the end of the 
period in column 4 labeled Closing X on Hand.  Fill in the Dividend per Unit of X Held in column 5.  
Record your Received Dividend Earnings for the period in column 6. In column 7, record your Closing 
Cash on Hand (this is your Beginning Cash on Hand + Change in Cash from Sales and Purchases + 
Received Dividend Earnings). In column 8, record your Average Holding Value of X on Hand.  Since all 
units of X have already paid the dividend for the period that was just completed, the Average Holding 
Value of X on Hand is the average dividend payment of 24 francs per period times the number of 
dividend payments remaining, so it is one less than the number shown on the Average Holding Value 
Table because that table assumes the dividend for the period has not yet been paid.  In column 9, 
record your Average Profit with No Further Trading (which is your Closing Cash on Hand plus the 
Average Holding Value of X on Hand).   Your earnings for this experiment are given by the Closing Cash 
on Hand at the end of period 15 because the Average Holding Value of X on Hand is 0 after the last 
dividend payment has been made.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Period Earnings Sheets are identical across treatments and thus refer to Double Action instructions. 
